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Abstract 
Proponents of a public health insurance plan, including President Obama, claim it is 
needed to stimulate competition. This paper challenges that claim from a national, state 
and local perspective. The evidence shows that at the national level the health insurance 
market generally is highly competitive for the 61 percent of privately insured Americans 
who now purchase their coverage through large groups.  
      At the state level, concentration in health insurance markets appears less disturbing 
than it appears for two reasons. States generally are too large to constitute a meaningful 
market for purposes of assessing antitrust concerns, and the limited empirical evidence 
that is available does not suggest that states with a dominant insurer suffer any significant 
adverse consequences. First, most concentrated markets tend to be dominated by 
nonprofit plans (mostly Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans).  Second, market concentration is 
not necessarily associated with adverse outcomes. For nonprofit Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
plans, increased market share historically has been associated with lower payments to 
providers, lower administrative costs and lower premiums. Even today market 
concentration among health insurers has a relatively small effect on current premium 
levels or recent rates of growth in health spending. The available evidence is inconsistent 
with the view that concentration is allowing health insurers to exploit their members.  
Instead, it squares with a more plausible view that concentration in the health insurance 
industry has provided a useful corrective to the more disturbing growth in concentration 
of hospital and physician markets over the past decade. 
      Even at the local level, roughly three-quarters of local markets that appear to have 
weak competition are dominated by nonprofit plans.  Such plans are no different than a 
public plan in terms of profit motive. In areas where lack of competition adversely affects 
those seeking to purchase health insurance, policymakers should consider more effective 
tools to restore competition that would be superior to reliance on a public plan. These 
include more effective state regulation of the individual and small group markets, more 
aggressive antitrust enforcement and allowing interstate sales of health insurance. 
        Finally, real world experience with the Medicare drug benefit (where fierce 
competition among private health plans has contributed to cost savings of nearly 40 
percent), the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program (which for decades generally 
has experienced lower premium growth than private health insurance and Medicare) and 
the State of California (whose market-oriented approach to health care has reduced its 
level of spending relative to the U.S. by nearly one-third in just twenty-five years) have 
demonstrated convincingly that competition among private insurers can work very 
effectively even without a public plan.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
        Proponents of a public health insurance plan, including President Obama, claim it is 
needed to stimulate competition.
1
 Leading proponents freely concede that ―an overall 
distrust of private insurers is a central motivation for the public plan option.‖2 A public 
plan is said to be needed as a benchmark on cost and quality to encourage private insurers 
to offer value for money to members and ―bargain more aggressively in consolidated 
provider markets.‖3  Lack of competition in insurance markets is presumed to inhibit 
incentives to drive hard bargains with providers or squeeze out excess administrative 
costs. A separate concern is that a public plan be available to serve as a backup option to 
ensure financial and health security to individuals and small employers who might 
otherwise lack access to a reasonably priced private-sector plan.  Advocates are skeptical 
that ―regulations or contracts will ensure that private insurers comply with all reforms for 
all people‖ – whether these relate to take-all-comer rules (―guaranteed issue‖) or refusals 
to pay for beneficial care.  Even if they trusted private plans not to put their own bottom 
line ahead of quality care and patient safety, many advocates would not have confidence 
that private competition alone would ensure affordable coverage, especially in rural areas 
or those markets perceived to be dominated by only one or two private plans. Finally, 
proponents also view a public plan as a backstop ―to bring down costs over time through 
innovations in payment and delivery, innovations that would be available to the private 
sector.‖4   
      There are four good reasons to question these claims.  This paper will demonstrate 
there is far more competition in private insurance markets than the above lines of 
criticism allege. Maintaining and strengthening such competition is a far more reliable 
strategy for achieving quality health care at an affordable cost than creating a dominant 
public plan that could undermine such competition and its beneficial effects. First, the 
evidence shows that, at the national level, the health insurance market generally is highly 
competitive for more than three-fifths of privately insured individuals. Second, the 
apparent lack of competition at the state level is irrelevant or benign. Most states that 
appear to lack competition are dominated by nonprofit plans. More importantly, states 
generally are too large to constitute a meaningful market area for purposes of assessing 
antitrust concerns, and the limited empirical evidence that is available does not suggest 
that states with a dominant insurer suffer appreciable adverse consequences. Third, 
insurer concentration in most local markets also has no adverse consequences. In reality, 
the vast majority of markets that appear to lack competition are dominated by nonprofit 
firms whose missions, motives, and economic incentives would be little different than 
those of a public plan. Moreover, the concentration of market power among just one or 
several health insurers may have served as a helpful counterweight to the growing market 
power of providers in recent years. Fourth, in local markets where lack of competition 
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among health insurers may be an issue, there are tools to restore competition that would 
be vastly superior to reliance on a public plan. This conclusion is based on real world 
experience that has demonstrated repeatedly that head-to-head competition among private 
insurers can produce sizable premium savings even without a public plan. 
      The sheer number of private health insurance companies (nearly 1300); ample 
alternatives to fully insured health benefits, such as self-funding or self-administration 
used by the majority of large employers; and modest profitability levels among private 
insurers together demonstrate that at the national level, the health insurance market 
generally is highly competitive for the 60 percent of privately insured Americans who 
now purchase their coverage through large employer groups. Thus, it makes little sense, 
as the current House-passed Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962) does, 
to allow for the possibility of a public plan being offered to such groups. 
       At the state level, several different analyses have concluded that health insurance 
markets in most states either are ―highly concentrated‖ or ―concentrated‖ (antitrust terms 
of art denoting states where a handful of firms control a lion‘s share of the market). But 
such state-level concentration in health insurance markets appears less disturbing than it 
appears for three reasons. As a practical matter, most states are too large to constitute a 
meaningful market for purposes of assessing whether one or more insurers maintain 
excessive market power.  
Second, the limited empirical evidence available shows that apparent market 
concentration at the state level is not necessarily associated with adverse outcomes. One 
of the most detailed studies to examine this issue found that among nonprofit Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield plans (which tend to be the dominant insurers in states where market 
share is concentrated among just one or two firms), increased market share historically 
has been associated with lower payments to providers, lower administrative costs and 
lower premiums. This finding admittedly is based on data more than one-quarter century 
old, but even more recent data (through 2004) suggests that market concentration among 
health insurers has a relatively small effect on current levels or recent growth in health 
spending. Specifically, there is only a small relationship between the share of the market 
controlled by the two largest firms and state-level private per capita health spending. In 
addition, health insurance market concentration explains only a small part in the rates of 
increase in private per capita health spending between 1999 and 2004. These simple 
correlations are inconsistent with the view that lack of competition among private health 
insurers is a major factor that explains either the high level of health spending in the 
United States.or its rapid growth.   
A third strand of evidence comes from a multivariate analysis of the impact of 
conversions of Blue Cross plans to for-profit status.  In states where such conversions 
occurred, there was a modest decline in health spending, risk of being uninsured, and 
increase in hospital profits relative to states in which no conversions occurred. This belies 
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the claim that for-profit insurers are using their market power to charge higher premiums 
or underpay hospitals in a ruthless pursuit of profits.  
At the local level, where competition should matter more, roughly three-quarters of 
local markets that appear to have weak competition are dominated by nonprofit plans: 
such plans are similar in several important ways to a public plan in that they do not seek 
to maximize their operating margins; of equal importance, their statutory obligations to 
provide a ―public benefit‖ presumably equip them to wield whatever market power they 
hold in a responsible fashion. In such cases, it is not all clear what the ―value-added‖ of a 
strong public plan might be. But even in markets where for-profit health insurers are the 
dominant players, concentration alone does not prove that market power exists or is being 
abused. First, even highly concentrated markets with nonprofit plans do not necessarily 
result in excess market power when the credible threat of entry by other plans would 
preclude even for-profit plans from earning outsized profits. Second, in many markets, 
concentration in the health insurance industry may well be providing a useful corrective 
to the equally disturbing growth in concentration of hospital and physician markets over 
the past decade. But again, if this countervailing power already is being deftly wielded by 
private insurers in most markets, it is difficult to see what a strong public plan brings to 
the table.   
       Indeed, if the problem of sluggish private sector competition is limited in geographic 
scope to just select local markets, then creating a national public plan to address that problem 
is the wrong tool to address this. It would be preferable and far less risky to find more 
targeted solutions. In areas where lack of competition adversely affects those seeking to 
purchase health insurance, policymakers have ample tools to restore competition that 
would be superior to reliance on a public plan. These include more vigilant state 
regulation of the individual and small group markets, more aggressive antitrust 
enforcement and allowing interstate sales of health insurance. 
       The conclusion that reliance on competition among private health plans can be 
trusted to work is based on extensive real world experience. Examples include the 
Medicare drug benefit (where fierce competition among private health plans has 
contributed to cost savings of nearly 40 percent relative to originally projected levels), the 
federal employee health benefits program (which for decades generally has experienced 
lower premium growth than private health insurance and Medicare) [recheck this trend 
for recent years, see Walt Francis‘ new book for us, and cite it, if applicable] and the 
State of California (whose generally market-oriented approach to health care reduced its 
level of spending relative to the United Statesas a whole by nearly one third over a period 
of just twenty-five years) have demonstrated convincingly that competition among 
private insurers can work very effectively even without a public plan.   
       Here‘s the evidence to support those conclusions.  
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OVERVIEW 
HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET CONCENTRATION 
      The argument for a public plan rests on the claim that vibrant competition in private 
health insurance markets is inhibited by widespread concentration in the health insurance 
industry. Such concentration allegedly provides private insurers with too much market 
power, allowing them to charge consumers higher premiums, deny more claims, increase 
their profit margins, and/or reward CEOs and top management with lavish salaries or 
perks that would not be possible in a more competitive market. The empirical basis for 
this claim will be examined shortly, but it is important to understand the meaning of the 
term ―concentration.‖  
       Concentration is a term of art used by antitrust enforcers and operationalized through 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI equals the sum of squared market 
shares of each firm in a market. Thus, its maximum value, 10,000, occurs when there is a 
single monopolist (100
2
=10,000). Under the most recent Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC)/Department of Justice (DOJ) Horizontal Merger Guidelines, markets with an HHI 
less than 1,000 are not concentrated (e.g., twenty firms with equal market shares of 5 
percent each would have an HHI of 20 x 5
2
 =500).
5
 Where the HHI lies between 1,000 
and 1,800, the market is considered ―concentrated.‖ In such markets, any merger that 
increases the HHI by more than 100 points may be subject to challenge by antitrust 
regulators due to significant concerns about competitiveness. In a twenty-firm market 
where market shares are otherwise equally divided, just a single firm with a 32-percent 
market share would be sufficient to make that market concentrated. Finally, markets are 
considered ―highly concentrated‖ when the HHI exceeds 1,800, a threshold met when a 
single firm has 42 percent of the market or when five firms have equal market shares. In 
such markets, any merger that increased HHI by more than 50 points would raise 
significant competitive concerns, while mergers boosting HHI by more than 100 points 
are presumed to be anti-competitive. Antitrust concerns can be overcome if there is 
evidence making it unlikely that a particular merger will create or enhance market power 
or facilitate its exercise, but the HHI parameters above at least provide a rough indicator 
of the relationship between market concentration and potential concerns about excess 
market power. 
THE PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET – PRESENT AND FUTURE  
        The March 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS) shows that, collectively, 
employment-based health insurance (176.3 million), public coverage (87.4 million), and 
nongroup coverage (26.8 million) insure more than 290 million covered lives.
6
 Of course, 
there are overlaps in coverage that reduce this gross estimate to a net figure of 255.1 
million, leaving 46.3 million people uninsured.
7
 Most discussions of private health 
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insurance simply differentiate between large groups (accounting for about 80 percent of 
private premiums), the small group market (about 15 percent of premiums) and the 
individual (nongroup) market (accounting for the remaining 5 percent)
8
.  
      Current health reform proposals do not use a consistent set of employer size 
boundaries. For example, the House-passed Affordable Health Care for America Act bill 
allows firms with twenty-five or fewer employees to buy coverage through a national 
insurance Exchange in 2013, firms with fifty or fewer employees in 2014, and firms with 
100 or fewer workers in 2015. However, a newly established Health Choices 
Commissioner also ―is permitted from this year forward to expand employer participation 
as appropriate, with the goal of allowing all employers access to the Exchange.‖9 Tax 
credits are available for small firms with ten or fewer employees if average wages are 
$20,000 or less, but these phase out for employers with twenty-five or more workers or if 
average wages reach $40,000 or more.
10
  
       The Senate-passed Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act would create state-
based exchanges for participants from the individual and small group markets. This 
proposal explicitly allows small businesses with up to 100 employees to purchase through 
state-based Small Business Health Options program (SHOP) exchanges starting in 2015, 
and gives states the option to allow larger firms to purchase SHOP coverage starting in 
2017. However, firms with fifty or more employees that do not offer coverage would 
have to pay a penalty for any employees who obtain subsidized coverage through an 
exchange. The plan also provides small-employer tax credits for firms with fewer than 
twenty-five, largely mirroring the House proposal in terms of the firm eligibility criteria 
that determine where such tax credits start and stop.
11
 
      Both the House and Senate reform proposals create at least one Exchange, but vary 
considerably in terms of who is eligible to purchase through this mechanism.  The picture 
is further clouded in that administrative discretion is provided in some proposals to allow 
the maximum size of groups permitted to purchase through the Exchange to be increased 
without any firm upper limit. For purposes of discussion, it is easiest to think in terms of 
two different groups of insurance purchasers: large employer groups that already 
purchase in a national marker and are the least likely candidates to need or want to 
purchase a public plan option, and smaller groups that purchase largely in single-state 
markets. But because of differences in how insurance is now regulated, various important 
subgroups are discussed separately within those two different geographically-defined 
(national vs. state) markets: 
 National Health Insurance Groups. (four subgroups):  
o Large Private Firms. This includes private firms with 500 or more 
employees (a cutoff that is somewhat arbitrary, but is consistent with the 
threshold used in the National Compensation Survey
12
) regardless of 
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whether they self-fund their health benefits or purchase fully insured 
products.  
o Other Self-Insured Private Firms. Self-funded health plans offered by 
employers are exempt from state regulation due to a longstanding federal 
law known as ERISA, which makes them subject to regulation by the U.S. 
Department of Labor.
13
 For this reason, self-funded plans for medium and 
small firms are another subgroup included as national purchasers (though 
such firms account for less than one-fifth of those with self-funded health 
benefits). 
o Public Employers.  This includes various health plans for public 
employees (federal, state and local), most of which are self-funded but 
some of which are fully insured health benefits plans purchased from 
private health insurers. 
o Military-Related Health Care. This includes Tricare (formerly 
CHAMPUS), CHAMPVA and VA/military health care.  Most of these 
health care arrangements consist of privately purchased health insurance, 
and the balance is provided through direct service delivery. Military care 
for active duty military is excluded from discussion since most such care 
is directly provided at DOD facilities, so these individuals will never be 
candidates for private insurance or participation in an Exchange. 
 State-Level Purchasers. (three subgroups):  
o Medium Employer Market.  This includes private firms with 51-499 
employees that offer fully-insured health benefits. Some analyses lump 
such groups with the large employer market,
14
 but those who are not self-
funded typically do not buy across state lines and hence are more reliant 
on the combination of market forces operating at the state or substate level 
and state-level health insurance regulation to ensure ready access to 
affordable health benefits. 
o Small Group Market. While others have lumped employers with as 
many as 100 to 249 employees into this category, a lower threshold is used 
for purposes of discussion in this paper, based on the regulatory practices 
of most states: firms with fifty or fewer employees.
15
 All states regulate 
the small group market to varying degrees, and the vast majority of states 
include firms with two to fifty workers under this regulatory umbrella 
(with nearly one-third of states including groups of one and a handful of 
states setting the upper bound at twenty-five or thirty-five workers). 
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o Individual Market. This includes those who purchase nongroup 
coverage, but excludes the many elderly who purchase private policies to 
supplement Medicare (also known as ―Medi-gap‖ plans).   
Each of these markets has unique characteristics and regulatory rules of the road 
that play an important role in how well private plan competition in each market plays out. 
NATIONAL MARKET IS HIGHLY COMPETITIVE  
      At the national level, the private insurance market already is highly competitive, 
involving 138 million Americans who obtain employment-based health benefits through 
large employers or self-funded arrangements. These individuals represent 69 percent of 
those with private health insurance in the United States.
16
 Table 1 summarizes the 
number of individuals in each of the major subgroups within this category. 
Table  1.  National Health Insurance Groups
Employer Class/Size
Active 
Workers* Retirees Dependents** Total
Private Employers 37.9 7.5 41.5 86.9
Large Firms (500+ employees) 32.3 7.2 36.3 75.8
Self-insured 26.3 6.0 29.3 61.5
Fully-insured 6.1 1.2 7.1 14.3
Other Self-insured Firms 5.6 0.3 5.2 11.1
Small Firms (1-50) 2.2 0.1 2.0 4.2
Medium Firms (51-499) 3.4 0.3 3.2 6.9
Public Employers 16.5 4.7 18.8 40.0
Federal Government 2.3 0.8 4.7 7.8
State government 4.2 1.1 4.1 9.4
Local government 10.1 2.8 10.0 22.8
Military-Related Health Care*** NA NA NA 11.0
Tricare/CHAMPUS NA NA NA 7.7
CHAMPVA NA NA NA 0.3
VA/Military Health Care NA NA NA 3.0
GRAND TOTAL 54.4 12.2 60.3 137.9
Employer-Based Coverage
 ** Excludes workers with own coverage who also are covered as dependents under an employer-based plan provided 
through a working spouse or other family member. 
*** Excludes active-duty military, but include military retirees and dependents of active-duty and retired military; figures 
have been adjusted for slight over-counting.
* Includes coverage from own employer; excludes workers covered only as dependents on an employer-based plan 
since such individuals may be covered by an employer in a class/size different than that of the worker. 
Own Employer Plan
 
        Competition in this market is extremely robust First, there is extensive head-to-head 
competition among private health insurers. Second, large employers have alternatives to 
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fully-insured health benefits that amplify the pressures private plans face from head-to-
head competition (or substitute for such competition in areas where it may be lacking). 
Third, private insurers in the national market exhibit only modest profitability levels. 
HEAD-TO-HEAD COMPETITION 
       Nationwide, there are nearly 1,300 companies that provide health insurance 
coverage.
17
 This does not imply that all such plans are national, but the four largest 
publicly traded health insurance companies – WellPoint, UnitedHealth Group, Aetna, and 
CIGNA – and other large insurers such as Humana and Assurant operate plans in all or 
nearly all states, making them a very viable choice for any employer needing to provide 
nationwide coverage for employees located in numerous states.
18
 Even though nonprofit 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans are organizationally separate across state lines (or even 
within major regions of states such as New York and Pennsylvania), the Blue Cross Blue 
Shield Association‘s BlueCard program essentially guarantees that members will get 
access to the preferred provider networks (and their companion discounts) negotiated by 
each individual plan. In addition, many large employers are regional in nature, thus 
expanding their range of choices to large regional plans such as Kaiser, Health Net, and 
Intermountain Healthcare. 
      At the national level, there is scant evidence of insurer concentration. Collectively, 65 
million lives are covered by nonprofit Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans, representing 32.3 
percent of the unduplicated count of persons with private coverage.
19
 But this involves 
enrollment in twenty-five independent plans, each of which serves non-overlapping 
geographic areas, i.e., making business decisions about product offerings, pricing and 
negotiating payment rates independently from one another. The five largest publicly 
traded firms together have a market share of 52.6 percent, with individual shares that are 
far smaller – including WellPoint (17.4 percent), UnitedHealth Group (16.4 percent), 
Aetna (8.8 percent), Cigna (5.8 percent) and Humana (4.2 percent).
20
 Apart from the 
sheer number of plans available and lack of market concentration, there are other reasons 
competition is so intensive for the employers who rely on this market. 
ALTERNATIVES TO FULLY-INSURED COVERAGE  
     While the reasons vary by group, each large purchaser has alternatives to fully-insured 
coverage that amplify the competitive pressures just described. In most cases, this takes 
the form of substantial purchasing clout that ensures private insurers serve their 
customers rather than the other way around. In other cases, it takes the form of private 
insurers displaced entirely – either by self-funded and self-administered benefits or 
medical services provided directly to eligible members.  Large purchasers – whether 
private or public – generally have several advantages compared to smaller groups or 
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individuals. By self-funding, they can avert the ―risk premium‖ associated with 
transferring uncertain health risks to a private insurer. Self-administration offers 
additional potential savings.  But even if large purchasers pay a private insurer for 
administrative tasks, there are economies of scale in administration that allow the largest 
groups to save about 5 percent of total health benefits costs relative to medium-sized 
groups and more than 15 percent relative to the smallest groups.
21
 Their ability to deliver 
more ‗covered lives‘ to an insurer is valuable in its own right, but also gives that insurer 
more bargaining power vis-à-vis prices paid to providers. Because their business is more 
valuable to win and keep, large purchasers tend to have the upper hand with private 
insurers, which act more as their agents in terms of taking prices rather than making 
them.   
 
PRIVATE EMPLOYERS  
        The exemption from state health insurance regulation conferred by ERISA provides 
a powerful motivation for large private employers to self-insure/self-fund their health 
benefits. Companies with self-funded benefits do not have to comply with costly health 
insurance mandates, pay premium taxes, or sequester the large costly reserves that state 
regulators require of health insurers and managed care plans. They may elect to purchase 
administrative services only (ASO) from private health insurance carriers, but they also 
have the option of making use of roughly 400 third party administrators (though some say 
the true number of health-benefits TPAs is closer to 3,500
22
). [You have not really 
explained the difference between TPA and ASO arrangements] Since TPAs claim to have 
corporate overhead costs as much as 40 percent lower than those of traditional insurance 
companies,
23
 their inclusion in the competitive landscape provides another powerful 
incentive to keep administrative costs as low as possible. Moreover, insurers and TPAs 
alike know that companies with self-funded benefits always have the option of self-
administering their benefits if they are dissatisfied with the performance of an outside 
administrator. That relatively few employers opt to do so is further evidence that 
competition in this market likely results in efficient health plan performance. 
         Thus, for nearly 87 million plan members who obtain their coverage through 
generally large and often multistate private employers with self-insured benefits, ―the 
number and relative size of local health plans may be largely irrelevant.‖24 There is fierce 
competition among national insurers for this business.  Although there has been some 
consolidation in subsequent years,
25
 the most recent published figures for 2003 indicate 
that the largest insurer serving this multistate employer market had only a 15 percent 
market share, and the seven largest insurers in this market had a combined market share 
of only 75 percent.
26
 As of 2005, TPAs collectively accounted for about 30 percent of the 
self-insured market.
27
 
     But even large employers purchasing fully insured health plans from carriers such as 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Aetna, Kaiser and others – products that are subject to state 
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regulation – are still in a different league than small employers.  The law of large 
numbers means that annual fluctuations in claims expense will be far less volatile than for 
a mom-and-pop grocery store, for whom an employee needing a $250,000 liver transplant 
could result in a ruinous increase in the premiums it is charged in subsequent years. In 
contrast, a large employer with 50,000 covered lives could absorb such an expense with 
only a small uptick in premiums. Moreover, even if such employers do not currently self-
insure, the very possibility ensures their health insurer will remain constantly attentive to 
their needs. 
 
PUBLIC EMPLOYERS  
This category includes health benefits provided to three large clusters of public 
workers: 
 FEHBP. The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program includes 7.8 million 
federal employees, retirees and their dependents.
28
  
 State Employees and Dependents. This includes health plans that together 
cover 9.4 million individuals in health plans offered to workers in state 
government (and District of Columbia) – including those working in state-run 
universities and community colleges. 
 Local Employees/Schoolteachers.  This includes 22.8 million workers, retirees 
and dependents covered by health plans offered to local government 
employees—including those working for public school systems.29 
  
       Although FEHBP is the nation‘s largest employer-sponsored health insurance plan, 
the federal government does not self-fund these benefits. Instead, it contracts with nearly 
300 different health plans across the country and incents employees to offer the best 
value for the money among plans that vary in benefit design, cost sharing and premiums. 
Strictly speaking, ERISA does not apply to health benefits plans provided to federal, state 
and local government.
30
 However, in accordance with boundaries established by the 
Constitution, the federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM) does preempt state 
regulations that would otherwise affect its seventeen national plans, thereby permitting 
them to offer uniform benefits.  However, it does not preempt state mandates that apply 
to more than 250 local FEHBP plans.
31
 Moreover, federal guidelines require the FEHBP 
standard option – which accounts for 48 percent of FEHBP enrollment in 200932 – to 
offer a level of coverage similar to that available to most Americans with large employer 
health benefits. A recent comparison found that ―with few exceptions, benefits in the 
FEHBP standard option either meet or exceed those that state mandates require.‖33 While 
the financial incentives to avoid the highest cost plans and enroll in the lowest cost plans 
are not as strong as in the past, most workers eligible for FEHBP coverage can choose 
among twenty or more plans in their local area
34
 – a degree of choice far more generous 
than for even those employed by the largest private firms.  The dominance of Blue Cross 
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plans (which cover 62 percent of FEHBP enrollees in 2009) is attributable to statutory 
restrictions on free entry of national plans, not lack of private plans that would be able 
and willing to serve this large group.
35
  
      Likewise, in most states, the state employee group is quite typically the largest single 
group, ensuring its purchasing clout with both national and local plans. For the 59 percent 
of state and local workers in self-insured plans,
36
 there should be no perverse incentives 
of private insurers to deny coverage or discriminate against high-risk plan members. But 
even in states with insured benefits, state employees tend to be the largest single insured 
group in the state, giving the state a high degree of leverage to protect the plan‘s 
members from any market abuses.   
         In Georgia, schoolteachers and retirees in all school districts are required to be part 
of the state employee health benefits plan. In twenty-one other states, participation in the 
state employee health benefits plan is voluntary for municipal employee groups, local 
school systems or both.
37
 Actual participation rates by local government groups vary 
greatly across states offering this option (depending in part on the generosity of the state 
employee health benefits plan). Local employees and/or schoolteachers who are part of 
the state employee group enjoy the same sort of purchasing clout described above. 
Likewise, even groups that have opted not to participate will have more leverage in 
dealing with national or local health insurers by virtue of having an alternative not 
available to most private employers. Finally, in the remaining states where participation 
in the state employee plan is not offered, municipal employees and schoolteachers 
nevertheless have the option to create a large purchasing group simply by banding 
together to form large countywide, regional or statewide pools.  
 
MILITARY HEALTH CARE  
      Military health care consists of three separate components: 
 TRICARE.  This program includes 9.5 million active duty service members, 
National Guard and Reserve members, retirees, their families, survivors and 
certain former spouses worldwide.
38
 While most receive direct medical 
services at hundreds of U.S. military treatment facilities around the world, all 
active duty military and activated National Guard and Reserve members are 
required to enroll (at no cost) in TRICARE Prime, a managed care plan that 
gives them access to a network of private providers throughout the U.S. 
Families of active duty military may also enroll in TRICARE Prime at no 
cost, but other TRICARE eligibles (e.g., military retirees) must pay a 
monthly premium for the Prime plan. Unless they elect to join the PRIME 
plan, all non-active duty TRICARE members throughout the United States 
are automatically enrolled at no cost in a fee-for-service plan called 
TRICARE Standard (out-of-network) and TRICARE Extra (a preferred-
provider network with less cost sharing). TRICARE was formerly known as 
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CHAMPUS (Comprehensive Health and Medical Plan for Uniformed 
Services). 
 CHAMPVA.  The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Department 
of Veterans Affairs is a health benefits program in which the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) shares the cost of certain health care services and 
supplies with eligible beneficiaries, a total of more than 300,000 dependents 
and certain survivors of veterans.
39
 
 VA Health. VA Health includes care to veterans provided by the Health and 
Medical Program of the Department of Veterans Affairs and direct care 
provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs.
40
 The VA does offer a 
standardized package of medical benefits, but generally veterans must be 
enrolled in the VA health care system to receive them. The VA operates the 
nation‘s largest integrated health care system with more than 1,400 sites of 
care, including hospitals, community clinics, community living centers, 
domiciliaries, readjustment counseling centers, and various other facilities. 
Priority is given to veterans based on their degree of service-connected 
disability, low income, POW status and other factors. The ability to obtain 
care therefore varies by medical center depending on the center‘s capacity 
vis-à-vis the priority status and utilization of veterans within that center‘s 
catchment area. Thus, while there are more than 20 million veterans, in 2008 
the VA system reported serving 5.8 million unique patients,
41
 (and only 3.2 
million reported having VA health benefits in the March 2009 CPS
42
).  
 
     TRICARE is self-funded, but it contracts for administrative services with three 
different national or regional health insurers to provide in-network and out-of-network 
coverage under Prime, Standard and Extra.  These insurers receive a share of any cost 
savings arising from lower-than-projected spending on benefits. The regional contracts 
facilitate on-going benchmarking of performance that can encourage improved 
performance from the health insurers that currently hold such contracts, as well as inform 
the standards used for future contracting (which is done at five-year intervals). In 
contrast, CHAMPVA is essentially self-funded and self-administered by the VA‘s Health 
Administration Center (HAC) in Denver, Colorado which processes CHAMPVA 
applications, determines eligibility, authorizes benefits, and processes medical claims.  It 
generally pays Medicare/TRICARE rates to providers. Most VA health care is provided 
through direct services provided by the VA system.  While the VA may authorize 
veterans to receive care at a non-VA health care facility when the needed services are not 
available at a VA health care facility, or when the veteran is unable to travel the nearest 
facility, such care must be pre-authorized in advance and is paid directly by the VA rather 
than a private health insurer.   
 
MODEST PROFITABILITY LEVELS  
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       Further evidence of the industry‘s competitiveness is seen in its relatively modest 
profitability levels.   
FOR-PROFIT HEALTH INSURERS  
      Despite recent industry consolidation,
43
 the largest companies  within the health care 
insurance/managed care industry (i.e., members of the Fortune 1000) earned a profit of 
only 3.9 percent of assets in 2008 (ranging from a low of -2.6 percent for Amerigroup to 
a high of 8.8 percent for HealthSpring). While critics have claimed that private health 
insurers ―make more money than any other business in America today,‖44 the industry‘s 
profitability ranked #28 among seventy-five industries compiled by Fortune magazine.
45
 
Even within the health care sector, there are few subsectors less profitable than health 
insurance/managed care (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
       For-profit health insurers fare even worse when net income is measured relative to 
revenues (Figure 2). Not only did their profit rate plummet in 2008 relative to the three 
prior years, but their ranking among all industries fell from #21 in 2005 to #35 in 2008. 
In contrast, notwithstanding general economic trends, most other parts of the health care 
sector saw a rebound in their profitability levels in 2008. Through mid-November 2009, 
for-profit health care plans had a net profit margin of 3.4 percent, ranking them #84 
among 215 industries tracked by Yahoo! Finance.
46
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      Notwithstanding rhetoric from policymakers claiming health insurers are "making 
record profits, right now"
47
 or that such profits are ―obscene,‖48 annual figures over 
nearly two decades (1990-2008) show that net income as a percent of revenues for 
publicly traded hospital and medical service plans averaged only 3.3 percent, ranging 
from a low of just under 0 percent in 2002 to a high slightly above 6 percent in 1994.
49
  
 
NONPROFIT HEALTH INSURERS 
     The foregoing figures do not include nonprofit health insurers such as Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield plans–which covers nearly one third of those with private insurance–or large 
nonprofit HMOs such as Kaiser, which is the dominant insurer in the nation‘s largest 
state. The latest figures show that the total margin (net income as a percent of revenues) 
for nonprofit Blues plans declined from 4.3 percent in 2007 to 2 percent in 2008.
50
 But 
this includes income from investment revenues.  Underwriting margins, which are 
calculated based only on premium income, were only 1.0 percent and 1.4 percent 
respectively during these years. This is consistent with historical data (1997-2001) 
showing that total margins for nonprofit Blue plans were 1-2 percentage points lower 
than those reported by for-profit Blue plans, with more than half this difference stemming 
from lower underwriting margins.
51
 
 
INDUSTRY-WIDE PROFITS 
     Across the entire health insurance industry (i.e., inclusive of all for-profit companies, 
as well as nonprofit insurers), after-tax profits in 2006 amounted to 2.9 percent of 
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premiums (4.1 percent before taxes).
52
 The trends presented earlier suggest that profits 
are likely to be lower in 2009 than in 2006, but even if the profit rate remained the same, 
after-tax profits would amount to $24.5 billion or about $122 per private health plan 
member.Were health insurers truly able to exercise considerable market power, we would 
expect far fewer competitors and much higher levels of profitability. In light of this, and 
assuming a level playing field in which no plan is given special advantages (e.g., the legal 
power to impose payment rates tied to Medicare, being able to piggyback on Medicare‘s 
administrative structures or being made the automatic ―fallback‖ insurer for those who 
fail to obtain coverage), adding one more public plan to this mix cannot credibly add to 
the fierce competitive pressures already felt in this market. It would be hard to justify 
giving large employer groups access to a public plan, especially when they have 
demonstrated by their own actions that private coverage is perfectly acceptable. Yet the 
House-passed health reform plan unaccountably allows (in Year 3 – 2015 – of the plan‘s 
implementation of the national health insurance exchange) employers of any size to 
purchase coverage through the national exchange in which the public plan will be 
offered.
53
 It even sets as a goal ―allowing all employers access to the Exchange.‖ 
Admittedly, the House allows the ―Health Choices Commissioner‖ to make this decision, 
while the Senate-passed health reform bill gives this discretion to individual states.  But 
why does it make sense to leave that unnecessary choice to either a federal or state 
bureaucrat? 
STATE-LEVEL CONCENTRATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE 
MARKETS IS RELATIVELY BENIGN 
While there is some overlap with the 83 million Americans covered by public plans 
such as Medicare and Medicaid, there are up to 144 million Americans (including 46 
million uninsured) who do, or could, purchase at least some private coverage in local 
markets that theoretically might be too concentrated for competition to enforce effective 
market discipline. Those purchasers include:  
 Medium-Sized Firms with Fully Insured Benefits.  Leaving aside those 
with fully insured health benefits from large private or public employers, there 
are 19 million Americans who obtain private coverage through fully insured 
health plans offered by medium-sized employers (51-499 workers).
54
 Primarily 
because such plans do not enjoy the protection from costly state regulations and 
premium taxes accorded to their self-funded counterparts, they face higher costs 
and fewer choices than large companies in the multistate market.
55
 Although they 
are not afforded any of the  special protections provided by federal or state 
regulation in the small group and individual markets (see below), their size does 
give them some bargaining advantage that smaller employers lack, as well as 
more stability of claims experience. 
 Small Group Market.  Federal regulations under HIPAA require all health 
insurance for firms with two to fifty employees to be offered on a guaranteed-
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issue, whole-group basis. All states (except the District of Columbia) impose 
additional regulations on the small-group market. Regardless of this greater 
regulatory scrutiny in terms of market conduct by small group insurers, small 
firms remain at a disadvantage relative to large firms.  Due to differences in 
economies of scale, they must pay higher premiums than large firms to obtain 
identical levels of coverage.  They have less bargaining power in negotiating 
prices.  They also face much more volatility in annual premium increases related 
to experience rating in states that do not impose community rating or narrow 
rating bands. Small firms are much more likely than large firms to change 
carriers annually, subjecting them to new underwriting of coverage and attendant 
changes in their experience-based  premiums..  Including more than 8 million 
self-employed workers/retirees/dependents who have employer-based coverage, 
a total of 32.0 million Americans in 2009 obtained fully-insured health coverage 
from employers with fewer than fifty workers.
 56
 
 Individual Health Insurance Market.  Excluding 10.3 million who 
purchase Medicare supplemental coverage, there were 16.4 million other 
Americans who had coverage through the nongroup market in March 2009.
57
 
Some federal regulations such as HIPAA portability rules apply to the entire 
market,
58
 but state regulations vary widely.
59
 
 Uninsured.  Of the 46.3 million uninsured reported by CPS, 12.0 million are 
workers or dependents of workers in small firms, 2.7 million are 
workers/dependents in medium firms, and another 23.9 million have work-based 
connections to large groups (including 2.9 million related to public sector jobs). 
This leaves only 7.7 million without any prospect of being able to obtain 
employer-based coverage – even if it is required under an employer mandate – 
who would automatically be candidates for the individual market. However, the 
reform proposals differ considerably in terms of whether the employers of 
uninsured individuals having work-based connections would be required to offer 
coverage or whether these particular uninsured individuals would qualify for 
coverage. Collectively, 62 percent of uninsured workers are in firms not offering 
health coverage, another 24 percent are ineligible for the coverage offered (e.g., 
being part-time workers or perhaps new on the job) and only 14 percent actually 
turned down offered coverage for which they are eligible.
60
  
 
      While state-level health insurance market concentration has been the focus of concern 
for many advocates of a public plan,
61
 as a practical matter, the observed concentration is 
largely benign for several reasons. Most states that appear to lack competition are 
dominated by nonprofit plans. More importantly, states generally are too large to 
constitute a meaningful market for purposes of assessing antitrust concerns. Not 
surprisingly, the limited empirical evidence that is available does not suggest that states 
with a dominant insurer suffer appreciable adverse consequences. 
MOST LOW-COMPETITION STATES DOMINATED BY NONPROFIT PLANS  
      Three recent studies have documented the extent of concentration in health 
insurance markets at the state level. However, closer analysis also shows that 
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nonprofit health plans tend to dominate in most states where concentration appears 
problematic. 
STATE-LEVEL COMMERCIAL INSURANCE MARKETS  
The first of these studies, conducted by Jamie Robinson, examined the overall 
market for commercial health insurance in 2002 and 2003.  It included all types of 
insurers (for-profit and nonprofit), all markets (employer-based and nongroup), all 
employers (public and private, self-funded and fully insured) and all types of products 
(HMO, PPO, fee-for-service).  Market share estimates could be calculated from data for 
all states except Alaska, Hawaii, and North Dakota. 
 Market Concentration. Based on 1997 federal antitrust guidelines, thirty-four 
states had ―highly concentrated‖ markets, another twelve states had 
―concentrated‖ markets, and only three were below the threshold for a low level 
of antitrust concern.
62
 
 Nonprofit Plan Dominance in Concentrated Markets . However, in 
twenty-six of the thirty-four ―highly concentrated‖ states, the dominant insurer is 
a nonprofit Blue Cross plan (the eight exceptions are Colorado, Connecticut, 
Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, and New Hampshire).
63
  
 Dominant Insurer Market Share. In forty-three states, the largest firm 
controlled 30 percent or more of the market; in sixteen states, this market share 
exceeded 50 percent.
64
 
 Nonprofit Firm Dominance of Dominant Insurer Markets. Nonprofit 
plans account for 79 percent of the first group (the nine exceptions being the 
eight states listed earlier plus Ohio) and 75 percent of the second (the exceptions 
being Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, and Virginia).
65
 
STATE-LEVEL HMO/PPO MARKETS  
       The second study is part of an annually-updated analysis from the American Medical 
Association (AMA) which examined the market in 2005 for HMO/PPO (Health 
Maintenance Organization; Preferred Provider Organization) products only. The analysis 
included all insurer-administered plans, including those that are self-funded, but excluded 
plans self-administered by employers. This information is reported for forty-four states 
(excluding the District of Columbia, Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, 
South Dakota, and West Virginia). This study was recently updated using 2006 data,
66
 
but because the findings are nearly identical and the report using 2005 data is readily 
available online for readers to examine for themselves, the analysis that follows is based 
primarily on the 2005 figures. Although the full report examines the PPO and HMO 
markets separately, the analysis below focuses on its reported figures for the combined 
HMO/PPO market.  This approach comes closest to the comprehensive picture painted by 
Robinson and also is most relevant in a world in which both employers and individuals 
can choose between those alternative types of coverage.  
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It should be noted that by focusing on a subset of the market, the AMA estimates 
tend to exaggerate actual market shares. For example, the AMA figures for 2006 report 
an eighty-nine percent market share for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama in that state, 
but based on CPS figures on the total number with private coverage and total enrollment 
reported by the company, the actual market share is closer to 75 percent.
67
 However, the 
AMA figures are the only ones that also examine the extent of market concentration at 
the MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) level, so it is worth examining these figures 
despite their limitations. Thus, taking the numbers as reported and using the same 1997 
antitrust guidelines cited earlier:  
 Market Concentration. In 2005, forty-two states had ―highly concentrated‖  
markets and two states (New York and Oregon) were ―concentrated.‖68 
 Nonprofit Plan Dominance in Concentrated Markets . However, in 72 
percent of the highly concentrated states and in both concentrated states, the 
largest insurer is a nonprofit plan.
69
 
 Dominant Insurer Market Share. In 2005, the largest firm controlled 30 
percent or more of the market in thirty-six states.  In twenty-five of the forty-four 
states examined, this market share exceeded 50 percent.
70
 However, by 2006, the 
number of states having a dominant insurer holding half or more of the market 
had declined to fifteen of forty-two states analyzed.
71
 
 Nonprofit Firm Dominance of Dominant-Insurer Markets. Of the 
twenty-five states with a single dominant insurer controlling at least half the 
market in 2005, all but nine are nonprofit plans (exceptions being in Connecticut, 
Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin).  Of the thirty-six states with a dominant insurer controlling 30 
percent of the market, nonprofit plans account for 72 percent  (i.e., excluding the 
nine plans just referenced plus the dominant insurer in Ohio).
72
  
 
STATE-LEVEL SMALL GROUP MARKETS  
While the first two studies focused on broadly defined markets in which large and 
medium-sized firms are the dominant purchasers, a third study examines concentration in 
the small group market. Concerns about competition in this market (in conjunction with 
the individual market) are reflected in almost all the reform plans approved by various 
congressional committees in 2009.  In one form or another, those plans  proposed the 
―remedy‖ of giving small groups a public plan option offered through some type of 
Exchange. Thus, understanding how much competition actually occurs in this market, as 
opposed to the overall health insurance market, arguably is more pertinent to the rationale 
for a public plan.  The GAO surveyed the small group market in December 2007, with 
forty-seven states reporting data (excluding Alaska, Michigan, New Mexico, and 
Pennsylvania).  
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 Number of Health Plans. The median state had twenty-seven different health 
plans providing coverage to small groups,
73
 ranging from a low of four carriers 
in Rhode Island to a high of 328 in Indiana.
74
 
 Dominant Insurer Market Share. Excluding eight states without small 
group market share data (District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, and Virginia), the dominant insurer had 30 percent or 
more of the market in thirty-four states and 50 percent or more in seventeen 
states.
75
 
 Nonprofit Plan Dominance of Dominant-Insurer Markets. Of the seventeen 
states where a single plan had 50 percent or more of the market, all but two of 
these plans are nonprofit (Maine and New Hampshire are the exceptions). Thus, 
in one of the principal markets for which a new public plan is targeted, nonprofit 
insurers constitute 88 percent of the dominant insurers. Even if the definition of 
dominant insurers is extended to include all plans with a market share of 30 
percent or more, nonprofit insurers still constitute 76 percent of the total 
(Connecticut, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, Vermont, and Wisconsin are the 
additional exceptions).
76
  
SUMMARY  
       Taking the Robinson and AMA studies together, it is worth noting that in all states 
except California, Nevada, New York, and Oregon, the largest health insurer is a Blue 
Cross or Blue Shield plan (and in California, New York, and Oregon, the largest plan is 
some other nonprofit plan).  Likewise, in the GAO study of the small  group market, 
―thirty-six of the 44 states supplying information on the top carrier identified a Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) carrier as the largest carrier, and in all but 1 of the 
remaining 8 states, a BCBS carrier was among the five largest carriers.‖77  GAO also 
found that BCBS market dominance had grown since 2002: ―the median market share of 
all the BCBS carriers in 38 states reporting this information in 2008 was about 51 
percent, compared to the 44 percent reported in 2005 and the 34 percent reported in 2002 
for the 34 states supplying information in each of these years.‖78 As will be detailed more 
fully in the discussion of local market concentration, it is difficult to see how a public 
plan – especially if it takes the form of state-level nonprofit cooperatives – would be an 
improvement over nonprofit plans that have accumulated decades of experience and trust 
among both prospective members and providers. 
Admittedly, in eleven of the forty-seven BCBS-dominated states identified in the 
Robinson and AMA compilations, the Blue plan is now for-profit (in Colorado, 
Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin), but these figures highlight the extent to which the problem of 
market concentration originated in state policies (e.g., tax exemption) that favored certain 
types of plans rather than through natural market forces. Blue plans lost full federal tax 
exemption in 1986, but continue to enjoy more limited federal tax breaks worth about $1 
billion annually.
79
  However, their tax-exempt status remains in some states. The scope of 
this tax exemption varies.  In some cases, it extends not only to state income taxes, but 
also to other business taxes, sales and use taxes and real and personal property taxes; 
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even if a state does not extend full tax exemption, Blue plans often have lower 
requirements for premium taxes, guaranty fund assessments and high-risk pool 
assessments relative to for-profit health insurers.
80
 If having a nonprofit Blue plan 
dominate a market is thought to be problematic, the most straightforward solution to this 
problem may be to revisit whether tax exemptions or similar privileges are warranted. On 
a related point, some have observed that small group reforms included under HIPAA 
have actually contributed to the high degree of volatility in the small group market – a 
recurring cycle in which insurers low-ball premiums to buy market share but then must 
rapidly increase premiums to stay afloat.
81
 There also is at least some evidence that 
federal and state regulation of the small group market has in some cases reduced the 
number of insurers or increased concentration in that market.
82
 
STATES ARE NOT RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS  
      Even if every state were dominated exclusively by for-profit plans, concentration at 
the state level is just not pertinent to determining whether excess market power is being 
exercised by private health insurers. For example, the  Department of Justice Antitrust 
Division itself has stated: ―[t]he relevant geographic markets in which HMO and HMO-
POS health plans compete are…no larger than the local areas within which managed care 
companies market their respective HMO and HMO-POS plans…[because][p]atients 
seeking medical care generally prefer to receive treatment close to where they work or 
live, and many employers require managed care companies to offer a network that 
contains a certain number of health care providers within a specified distance of each 
employee‘s home.‖83 
        Likewise, two experts who recently helped craft a comprehensive FTC report on 
competition in health care  – David Hyman and William Kovacic – have stated even 
more bluntly: ―there is no evidence that individual states constitute relevant geographic 
markets for health insurance – and there is considerable evidence to the contrary.‖84  
THE IMPACT OF MARKET CONCENTRATION ON HEALTH SPENDING 
      Although it may seem counterintuitive, state-level market concentration in health 
insurance markets is not always associated with adverse outcomes. A study of nonprofit 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans, using state-level data from 1986 through 1988, found that 
higher market share for such plans (which often were the dominant plans in their 
respective states) was associated with: 
 Lower Provider Payments. A 10-percent increase in market share was 
associated with an 11.6-percent reduction in payments to providers. In addition, a 
10-percent increase in plan size (number of members) was correlated with a 5-
percent reduction in provider payments.
85
 This suggested that Blue plans had and 
were exercising monopsony power to hold down health care costs in the form of 
payments to providers.  
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 Lower Administrative Costs. Similarly, a 10-percent increase in market share 
produced a 6.9-percent reduction in administrative costs. A 10-percent increase 
in plan size was associated with a 1.66 percent reduction in such costs.
86
  
 Lower Premiums. A 10-percent increase in market share resulted in a 6.2-
percent premium reduction.
87
 
      Thus, for nonprofit Blue plans, market concentration appears to have the beneficial 
effect of allowing them to reduce provider payments and lower administrative costs, 
resulting in savings that evidently are passed along to plan members in the form of lower 
premiums. This is hardly a ―problem‖ in need of a solution. 
      Admittedly, these results are only suggestive, as they do not address what happens in 
markets where a for-profit plan is the dominant insurer. Moreover, even for nonprofit 
plans, things may be different two decades later.  Yet using state-level health spending 
data for the latest year for which is available (2004), the simple correlation between the 
state-level market share held by the two largest health plans and per capita private 
medical spending is only 0.33.
88
 While statistically significant, it likely is biased upwards 
because it does not control for any other factors, including the possibility that the causal 
relationship is reversed (i.e., that high spending may result in a different market structure 
rather than higher concentration leading to higher spending).  Nevertheless, even taken at 
face value, this relatively low level of correlation implies that market share explains only 
about 11 percent of the differences in private health spending across states. States with 
higher market shares for the two largest plans do tend to have higher levels of health 
expenditures, but what is of equal importance is the wide variation in outcomes even for 
states that are identical in the apparent degree of health insurer dominance. Other things 
apparently matter much more, such as the nature and scope of state efforts to regulate 
health insurance. In short, market concentration among insurers is far from the most 
important factor in explaining high health care costs. Moreover, the correlation between 
this same market share figure and the annualized increase in private health spending over 
the past five years is only 0.17, which is not even statistically significant. 
     While strong conclusions cannot be drawn from these back-of-the-envelope 
calculations unadjusted for other factors, one other study bears mentioning because it 
speaks directly to claims that, absent a public plan to ―keep them honest,‖ for-profit plans 
may result in higher premiums. A recent longitudinal analysis of the impact of 
conversions of Blue Cross plans to for-profit status using state-level data from 1980 to 
2004 found that such conversions were associated with a strong and consistent pattern of 
lower-than-expected per capita expenditures on physician services that persisted four or 
more years following conversion. A similar pattern was observed in for-profit 
conversions being associated with a lowering of the state‘s uninsured rate relative to the 
national average. While transitory in duration, these conversions also were associated 
with an increase in hospital profitability, suggesting that those welfare gains do not 
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necessarily come at the expense of hospitals.
89
 Such results belie the too-common belief 
that allowing profits in health insurance can only lead to mischief. 
 
WHY LOCAL MARKET CONCENTRATION DOES NOT REQUIRE 
A PUBLIC PLAN SOLUTION 
 
       But the foregoing state-level look at competition does not tell the whole story. As 
suggested in the AMA study: ―The realities of the delivery of health care, as well as the 
marketing and other business practices of health insurers, lead to a conclusion that health 
insurance markets are local. From the standpoint of the market for health insurance, most 
sellers (insurers) market locally, for the obvious reason that purchasers (employers) are 
interested in purchasing health insurance products that will service their employees in 
proximity to where they work and live.‖90 There is concentration in many local markets, 
but nonprofits plans dominate most of them. Highly concentrated markets with nonprofit 
plans do not necessarily result in excess market power, because the credible threat of 
entry by other plans precludes even for-profit plans from earning outsized profits. In 
many markets, concentration in the health insurance industry also may be providing a 
useful corrective to the equally disturbing growth in concentration of hospital and 
physician markets over the past decade. To the degree that concentration in local markets 
is thought to be a problem, there are far better more targeted solutions that do not pose 
the drawbacks of a public plan. 
MOST LOW-COMPETITION LOCAL MARKETS DOMINATED BY 
NONPROFITS 
      Even when we examine competition from a city-level perspective, nonprofit firms 
again dominate the lion‘s share of areas in which lack of competition appears to be a 
problem. The AMA study cited earlier also examined market concentration in the 
nation‘s 313 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs): 
 Market Concentration. Based on 1997 federal antitrust guidelines:  
o In 2005, 96 percent of 313 MSAs were classified as highly concentrated 
based on 1997 federal antitrust guidelines.
91
 In the update using 2006 data, 
94 percent of 314 MSAs were so designated.
92
 
o Likewise, in 96 percent of MSAs, one health plan accounted for at least 30 
percent of the combined market in 2005.
93
 This figure had declined to 89 
percent of 314 MSAs in 2006.
94
 
 Nonprofit Plan Dominance. When the 2005 data are examined more closely, in 
61.3 percent of those MSAs, a nonprofit Blue plan is dominant and in another 
10.9 percent, the nonprofit Blue plan is the second largest competitor.
95
 Thus, 
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for-profit plans represent the two largest plans in only 27.8 percent of local 
markets. 
      Since a ―distrust of private insurers is a central motivation for the public plan 
option‖96 and a public plan purportedly would ―be reassured by…an entity that was 
designed to break even, to not earn a profit,‖97 one might expect the public to have the 
same level of trust in a nonprofit plan as a public plan, because neither would be expected 
to make a profit – particularly in light of the evidence that high market share for nonprofit 
Blue plans appears to result in lower premiums. If so, then concerns about market 
concentration would be limited to only about one-quarter of the country. 
EXCESS MARKET POWER NOT INEVITABLE IN CONCENTRATED 
MARKETS  
      But even that one-quarter of local markets estimate may substantially overstate the 
extent to which insurer concentration is really a problem. First, ―high HHIs [i.e., 
concentration] do not demonstrate that market power exists or is being exercised.‖98  
MSA-level concentration ratios of the sort calculated each year by the AMA are used by 
antitrust regulators only as a screening tool to identify where excess market power might 
be a problem. A high ratio itself is not grounds for antitrust enforcers to seek a remedy. 
Instead it is the starting point for a careful investigation of whether in fact a firm or even 
an entire industry wields excess market, including whether it attained such market power 
illegally.
99
 
     While it may seem counterintuitive that highly concentrated health insurance markets 
would not necessarily give plans market power to obtain supra-normal profits, the 
standard explanation by health economists is that such markets are contestable.
100
 Even in 
concentrated markets, the credible threat of entry can produce "competitive" market 
conditions, including lower prices, increased quantity and more efficient administrative 
cost structures. If the contestability of markets offers a powerful and reliable deterrent to 
abusing market power even to dominant health insurers, this further reduces the number 
of instances in which some way of restoring or enhancing competition is needed. 
     Rising concentration in health insurance markets also cannot be completely 
understood without the realization that ―provider markets, particularly hospital markets, 
have also become increasingly concentrated in recent years.‖  Specifically, the fraction of 
large metropolitan area residents living in highly concentrated hospital markets rose from 
71 percent in 1990 to 88 percent by 2003.
101
 There is substantial evidence that hospital 
rates are much higher in concentrated markets,
102
 suggesting that, absent countervailing 
power from insurers, patients might be just as vulnerable to exploitation by providers as 
they purportedly are to profit-motivated insurers. The previously cited study of nonprofit 
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Blue plans provided evidence that such plans used their monopsony power to reduce 
payments to providers, and they apparently passed those savings on to their members in 
the form of lower premiums. At least four more recent studies have demonstrated that 
greater insurer bargaining power results in lower hospital prices, while another has shown 
that health insurer concentration is associated with reductions in physician earnings.
103
 
But this suggests that increasing insurer competition while leaving in place concentrated 
markets for hospitals or doctors may well make patients worse off rather than better. 
Conversely, only in markets lacking provider concentration will enhancing competition 
among insurers be certain to improve matters.  
        Two recent studies paint a less rosy picture of consolidation. Both are based on a 
private national database of more than 800 employers (mostly large, multistate, publicly-
traded firms) between 1998 and 2006. The first analysis, by Leemore Dafny, suggests 
that private health insurers both possess and exercise market power by charging high 
premiums to more profitable firms (holding all other factors constant).  This effect is 
stronger in areas with greater concentration.
104
 Such ability to exploit the reluctance of 
firms to change health plans during periods of high profits would not be expected in a 
competitive market. 
        The second study, by Dafny and several coauthors, documented that most local 
markets are becoming concentrated over time, with the share categorized as ―highly 
concentrated‖ increasing from 68 percent in 1998 to 99 percent by 2006.105 Even after 
controlling for an extensive set of health plan characteristics, premiums did not rise more 
rapidly in markets that experienced the largest increases in concentration. However, 
because increases in concentration are related to other determinants of premium growth, 
this study isolated the effect of concentration by examining changes in concentration that 
occurred due an arguably unexpected ―shock‖ to the system: the merger of Aetna and 
Prudential. By comparing what happened in light of the widely varying changes in HHI 
across different markets that resulted from this merger, the authors isolated the ―pure‖ 
effects of increases in concentration from other factors affecting premiums (including the 
long-term secular increase in concentration over this period). Once concentration is 
isolated in this fashion, the authors conclude that increased concentration does result in 
higher premiums. Applying their result to the observed increase in concentration from 
1998 to 2006, the authors estimate that private health insurance premiums nationwide 
were 2.1 percent higher in 2006 than they would have been had concentration remained 
unchanged. Given that inflation-adjusted premiums doubled during this period, these 
findings imply – as suggested by the earlier back-of-the-envelope estimates — that 
consolidation accounts for ―very little of the steep increase in health insurance premiums 
in recent years.‖106  The authors concede these results cannot necessarily be extrapolated 
to other markets such as those for small group or nongroup insurance, and they caution 
further that this finding is based on a single merger. Conversely, however, their analysis 
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only examined increases in concentration during the period studied and hence provided 
no indication of how much the level of consolidation already achieved by 1998 may have 
increased premiums relative to the levels that would have been observed in a more 
competitive market. 
        If the problem of sluggish private sector competition is limited in geographic scope, 
then creating a national public plan to address that problem is overkill, akin to squashing 
a gnat with a sledgehammer.  It would be preferable and far less risky to find more 
targeted solutions. But these same solutions have merit even if concentration is viewed as 
a nationwide phenomenon. 
COMPETITION CAN WORK WITHOUT A PUBLIC PLAN 
SUPERIOR ALTERNATIVES TO ADDRESSING LACK OF COMPETITION 
      Admittedly, there are some public plan proponents who argue that public distrust of 
private insurers extends to nonprofit plans as well.
107
 Federal tax exemption was taken 
away from Blue Cross plans more than two decades ago on grounds that they appeared 
little different from commercial insurers in terms of how they behaved in the market. 
More recent evidence that compares nonprofit Blue plans with for-profit Blue plans 
suggests that, on many dimensions, there are no significant differences in plan behavior 
or performance.
108
 As illustrated earlier, there is a small but consistent pattern of 
nonprofit Blue plans having lower margins (by only 1-2 percent) than either their for-
profit Blue counterparts or for-profit health insurers more generally. But this line of 
thinking raises the equally legitimate question of why a public plan – especially the ―less 
muscular‖ versions embodied in the House or Senate bills – would be expected to behave 
any differently than a nonprofit plan. However, whether it is one-quarter of the country or 
nearly the entire country where weak competition is a concern, there are far more direct 
and less risky approaches to addressing this problem than establishing a public plan. 
MORE VIGILANT INSURANCE REGULATION 
       First, to the extent that lack of competition is a problem, it is most keenly felt in the 
markets for nongroup and small group coverage. But these are the very markets where 
state regulatory oversight of market conduct already is (or could be) most intense. If, as 
public plan proponents claim, ―key data about administrative costs and factors driving 
premiums are not publicly available,‖109 there is no reason in principle that state 
regulators could not require this of health plans serving the two markets already under 
regulatory scrutiny. Actions that have aroused the greatest public concern, such as having 
coverage cancelled (rescinded) when insured individuals get sick or refusals by insurers 
to authorize covered benefits, already are illegal.  This suggests that better enforcement 
of existing laws, rather than enactment of new ones, may be warranted. Insurance 
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regulators might also do a better job of explaining to consumers the rationale for practices 
such as exclusions for pre-existing conditions and rescissions so that they better 
understand how such practices actually benefit consumers by ensuring the availability of 
affordable coverage. Likewise, the general public might benefit from being made more 
aware of its options for appealing disputes about medical necessity, 
experimental/investigative treatment, emergency room reimbursement or similar matters. 
Public distrust of insurers might well be placed in perspective if regulators did a better 
job of demonstrating how infrequently complaints are filed against health insurers 
relative to the huge number of claims processed or members served. 
MORE AGGRESSIVE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
      But if public plan proponents truly are correct that ―the insurance industry is hard to 
regulate,‖110 then aggressive antitrust enforcement offers far greater promise for restoring 
competition than would a public plan. In a recent merger challenge, ―the DOJ 
[Department of Justice] recognized that where a health plan accounts for more than 30 
percent of a physician‘s practice revenue, the health insurer can have monopsony power 
to the detriment of patients.‖111  But this concern would apply with equal force to a public 
plan that commanded a sizable market share.  Indeed, it would seem rather contradictory 
to punish monopsonistic practices by private plans while simultaneously promoting these 
same practices in a public plan. The burden of proof is on public plan advocates to 
explain why a dominant public plan would be better for patients or providers than a 
private insurer in the same competitive position. In short, using the tools and criteria 
already developed by federal antitrust regulators to limit the size of health plans would be 
superior to simply replacing a private monopsony with a public one. Antitrust regulators 
also have the advantage of being able to use those same tools to focus on the problem of 
provider concentration.  That would avoid the risk of unilaterally disarming a beneficial 
countervailing force in the insurance market that has been able to constrain the ability of 
providers to exercise their own market power. 
INTERSTATE SALE OF HEALTH INSURANCE 
     Realistically, more rigorous antitrust enforcement could take a long time, especially if 
the problem of concentrated insurance markets is pervasive.  For at least two decades, 
―the most important source of competitive pressure in health insurance has been the 
availability of new entrants, including start-up HMOs and carriers from adjacent 
geographic regions.‖112 But because the McCarran-Ferguson Act delegated authority to 
regulate insurance to the states more than six decades ago, insurance companies wanting 
to sell products across state lines must comply with a myriad of different state 
regulations, including mandated benefits, premium taxes, solvency requirements, and 
similar rules. Collectively, such state regulations are estimated to increase premiums by 
10 to 96 percent.
113
 Those costs are in addition to the widespread geographic variations in 
 
Page 
29 
 
  
health spending that are related to differences in practice patterns.  Together, these result 
in a nearly five-fold difference in average premiums across states.
114
 Removing 
regulatory barriers to cross-border sales thus offers the prospect of greatly increasing 
competition and reducing regulatory costs very quickly. It is even possible to imagine this 
strategy making some headway against practice variations by encouraging greater 
innovation in the use of regionally based practice guidelines or improved tools for 
monitoring and changing the behavior of outlier practice patterns. This is not an 
unprecedented idea.  For example, Medicare law already generally preempts state 
regulation of Medicare Advantage (private) plans but allows the states to regulate plan 
solvency and licensure.
115
 There are several alternative approaches to reducing barriers to 
cross-border sales: 
 Interstate Sales of Insurance Plans.  One option, as illustrated by the  
Health Care Choice Act (H.R. 2355 and S.1015) proposed by Representative 
John Shadegg (R-AZ) and Senator Jim DeMint (R-SC), respectively, would 
allow interstate sales of private insurance plans while preserving states‘ primary 
responsibility for the regulation of health insurance.
116
  A recent analysis found 
that in some cases, New Jersey residents could achieve a premium savings of 
more than 50 percent simply by crossing the border to purchase the identical 
coverage in Pennsylvania, where regulatory costs are far lower.
117
 Nationally, 
this policy reform could reduce costs sufficiently to reduce the number of 
uninsured by about 12 million.
118
 
 Federal Certification of Health Plans. This would allow health insurance 
plans that meet federal regulations governing large self-insured plans to offer 
plans on a nationwide basis free of state regulations (except perhaps those 
governing day-to-day market conduct). This approach would reduce health costs 
nationally by about 7 percent.
119
 
 Harness Competitive Federalism. There are a variety of approaches to 
allowing cross-border sales while retaining regulatory authority at the state level 
along with suitable safeguards to ensure states handle such regulation even-
handedly and responsibly.
120
 
      The approaches just described are much more sensibly limited options that would 
address lack of competition where it exists without creating a public plan that simply 
duplicates the pressure of market forces for health insurers to provide good value for the 
money.  And even if one believes that lack of competition among health insurers is a 
national phenomenon, these approaches offer excellent prospects for reducing costs 
without the corresponding risks posed by a public plan. 
REAL-WORLD EXPERIENCE WITH PRIVATE PLAN COMPETITION 
      But how do we know that competition can be relied upon to produce the desired 
results?  Because we have real-world experience with competition in health care: 
MEDICARE PART D EXPERIENCE 
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      Over strong objections from those who now argue most fervently for a public plan, 
the Medicare drug benefit, approved under the Medicare Modernization Act in 2003, was 
provided exclusively through private plans rather than through a Medicare-like public 
plan structure. What happened? 
 Widespread Choice of Drug Plans . Since not a single private stand-alone 
drug plan existed when the drug benefit was enacted, ―a major source of 
uncertainty was whether private insurers would be willing to sponsor stand-alone 
prescription-drug plans. Ultimately, concern about the viability of the 
private drug plan
 
market was unwarranted… In 2006 and each year 
thereafter, beneficiaries across the country have had access to dozens of stand-
alone plans and, in many counties, at least as many Medicare Advantage drug 
plans.‖121 As of 2009, there were nearly 1,700 stand-alone drug plans and more 
than 2,000 Medicare Advantage plans from which to choose.
122
  
 36 Percent Increase in Drug Coverage. Despite deep misgivings about 
whether a voluntary benefit actually would significantly expand coverage, the 
number enrolled in drug plans surged.  Sixty-six percent of Medicare enrollees 
had drug coverage in 2004, compared to 90 percent  in 2009. 
 Massive Cost Savings. There also was deep skepticism about whether private 
plans could possibly drive costs lower than if the government directly negotiated 
―take-it-or-leave-it‖ prices with drug manufacturers.  Yet compared to original 
budget estimates for Medicare Part D, ten-year costs now are projected to be 
38.5 percent lower than originally planned.
123
 Eighty-five percent of this cost 
reduction has been attributed to ―a direct result of competition and significantly 
lower Part D plan bids.‖124  
 
       No public plan was needed to stimulate the fierce private sector competition that 
produced these results. If pure private sector competition works this well for the elderly, 
it is incumbent on public plan proponents to explain why it would not work for the rest of 
the country.   
FEHBP EXPERIENCE 
       For nearly six decades, the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) 
has provided health coverage to the president, all members of Congress, federal 
employees and dependents (7.8 million people were covered in 2008).
125
 Key features 
include: 
 No Standard Benefit. Quite unlike Medicare, FEHBP offers no standardized 
health plan, but instead trusts its members to choose from a wide selection of 
plan choices ranging from high-deductible, consumer-directed health plans with 
companion health savings accounts to managed care plans to very 
comprehensive fee-for-service plans. 
 Numerous Plan Choices. There are almost 300 health insurance plans 
available to members,
126
 including a dozen national plans, over 250 health 
maintenance organization (HMO) options, and dozens of High-Deductible Plan 
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(HDP) options. Thus, workers have an ample selection of plan choices regardless 
of where they live. 
 Incentive to Shop Wisely. Unlike many employers who may contribute 80, 
90 or 100 percent of a plan‘s premium regardless of cost, the federal government 
pays either 72 percent of the average premium or 75 percent of the premium of 
the specific plan selected, whichever is less. This provides strong incentives to 
avoid the most expensive plans, but diminishes the incentive to select a plan 
whose costs are far below average. 
       By empowering nearly 8 million plan members to vote with their feet every year‘s 
open season for plan selection, FEHBP has stimulated a fierce competition among private 
health plans to provide good value for the money to its members (and the taxpayers who 
finance these public employee benefits). As a consequence: 
 Performance Superior to Private Insurance. Annual growth in FEHBP 
spending per enrollee typically has been lower than in private health insurance 
plans with the exception of a few isolated time periods.
127
 This should not be 
surprising given that 49 percent of employees with employer-provided health 
benefits do not get any choice among health plans.
128
 Even among those given a 
choice of plan, less than one in five workers receive a fixed dollar contribution 
towards their health coverage and only a fraction of those employees are 
permitted to reap the full economic benefit of making cost-conscious choices.
129
 
But large employers such as Stanford University that have adopted models 
similar to FEHBP have reported premium savings of 43 percent relative to the 
cost of offering a single fee-for-service health plan.
130
 
 Performance Superior to Medicare.  Its overall performance is best summed 
up by Harry Cain, a former vice president of the Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
Association with decades of experience with both the FEHBP and Medicare, 
who stated in 1999 that ―the FEHBP has outperformed Medicare every which 
way – in containment of costs both to consumers and the government, in benefit 
and product innovation and modernization, and in consumer satisfaction.‖131 
Indeed, an exhaustive comparison with Medicare has shown that FEHBP is 
superior on a variety of dimensions, including control of costs per enrollee, 
quality, stability and rate of improvement in benefits, and innovativeness.
132
 
       Moreover, because of extensive choice of plans, FEHBP has easily been able to 
accommodate occasional instances in which a participating health plan failed, with 
minimal disruption for the beneficiaries.
133
 FEHBP has achieved all these benefits 
without ever including a public plan option.  If members of Congress see no need for a 
public plan for themselves, why should it be necessary for any other Americans? 
COMPETITION IN CALIFORNIA 
       While it has reversed itself to some extent in recent years, California for decades was 
widely viewed as having one of the most competitive health care markets in the entire 
country. In the mid-1980s, the state greatly deregulated its health system.  It discarded 
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Certificate of Need (CON) and strongly encouraged a movement towards selective 
contracting with health providers that stimulated fierce head-to-head competition. In 
conjunction with becoming the first state to have its Blue Cross plan convert to for-profit 
status, California‘s policies transformed its health insurance market, culminating in fierce 
head-to-head insurer competition between nonprofit Kaiser, for-profit Wellpoint, and 
nonprofit Blue Shield, among others. In contrast, during the same period, New Jersey 
maintained one of the most highly regulated health sectors in the country and retained a 
nonprofit Blue plan as its dominant insurer.
134
 What happened? 
  
  
  
 Performance Superior to National Average. California‘s per capita health 
spending had been 18-20 percent above the national average from 1966 through 
1980. By 2004, it had plummeted to 12 percent below the national average. 
Conversely, New Jersey began this period with a level of per capita spending that 
was 25 percent below California‘s, but by 2004, its spending level was 17 
percent higher than California‘s.135 
 Shrinking Burden of Health Spending . Similarly whereas health spending 
in California as a percent of GSP (gross state product) was 4 percent higher than 
in the United States as a whole in 1980, by 2004 it was 17 percent lower. At the 
national level, health spending as a percentage of GDP increased by 11 percent 
between 1993 and 2004, California was a rare state in which this measure of the 
burden of health spending actually declined slightly during the same period.
136
 
      Competition among private health plans is not just a theoretical ideal: it works on the 
ground.  The experiences we‘ve had with Medicare Part D, FEHBP and in the state of 
 
Page 
33 
 
  
California should leave little doubt that it is a strategy that can reap great rewards for the 
nation if it is given a chance. 
CONCLUSIONS 
       Proponents of a public health insurance plan, including President Obama, claim it is 
needed to stimulate competition. Yet the evidence shows that at the national level the 
health insurance market generally is highly competitive for the 61 percent of privately 
insured Americans who now purchase their coverage through large groups.  
      At the state level, concentration in health insurance markets appears less disturbing 
than it appears for two reasons. States generally are too large to constitute a meaningful 
market for purposes of assessing antitrust concerns, and the limited empirical evidence 
that is available does not suggest that states with a dominant insurer suffer any significant 
adverse consequences. First, most concentrated markets tend to be dominated by 
nonprofit plans (mostly Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans).  Second, market concentration is 
not necessarily associated with adverse outcomes. For nonprofit Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
plans, increased market share historically has been associated with lower payments to 
providers, lower administrative costs and lower premiums. Even today market 
concentration among health insurers has a relatively small effect on current premium 
levels or recent rates of growth in health spending. Specifically, there is only a small 
relationship between the share of the market controlled by the two largest firms and state-
level, private per capita health spending. Health insurance market concentration also 
explains only a small portion of the rates of increase in private per capita health spending 
between 1999 and 2004. This is inconsistent with the view that concentration is allowing 
health insurers to exploit their members.  Instead, it is consistent with a more plausible 
view that concentration in the health insurance industry has provided a useful corrective 
to the more disturbing growth in concentration of hospital and physician markets over the 
past decade. 
      Moreover, at the local level, roughly three-quarters of local markets that appear to 
have weak competition are dominated by nonprofit plans.  Such plans are no different 
than a public plan in terms of profit motive. In areas where lack of competition adversely 
affects those seeking to purchase health insurance, policymakers should consider more 
effective tools to restore competition that would be superior to reliance on a public plan. 
These include more effective state regulation of the individual and small group markets, 
more aggressive antitrust enforcement and allowing interstate sales of health insurance. 
        Finally, real world experience with the Medicare drug benefit (where fierce 
competition among private health plans has contributed to cost savings of nearly 40 
percent), the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program (which for decades generally 
has experienced lower premium growth than private health insurance and Medicare) and 
the State of California (whose market-oriented approach to health care has reduced its 
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level of spending relative to the U.S. by nearly one-third in just twenty-five years) have 
demonstrated convincingly that competition among private insurers can work very 
effectively even without a public plan.   
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